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People move across regions of a country or from one country to another to improve their 
working conditions, find better opportunities, or to escape violence, among other reasons. In the 
past, migration often meant the migrant was cut off from, or had limited communication with, 
family and friends left behind. However, technological advances in telecommunications have 
greatly increased migrants’ ability to communicate with family members and friends in their 
home community. These advances in technology have also simplified domestic and international 
money transfers, thus allowing migrants to send money back home to support family and friends. 
By simply paying a small fee to a money transfer agency (e.g., Western Union), migrants can 
make funds available in their home community within minutes. A recent study by the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Inter-American Development Bank 
estimates that in 2006 alone migrant workers sent home more than $300 billion U.S. dollars 
[International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2007]. 
Previous studies have used an extensive list of variables related to the migrant, the 
household, and the home country to explain the motivations of migrants to remit money home. 
However, there is still no consensus about migrants’ motivations to remit. In one of the first 
studies on the subject, Lucas and Stark (1985), using information on a drought that occurred in 
Botswana, tested the insurance motivation to remit. The insurance motivation suggests that by 
leaving the household and moving to another region or country, the migrant will be subjected to 
risks that are uncorrelated to those that the household faces; hence, the migrant and the 
household are able to diversify their risks [see also Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006b; Choi and 
Yang 2007]. In their study, Lucas and Stark, posited that if a coinsurance agreement was in place 
between the migrant and the household, households with a higher risk of losing crops or cattle,   3
given the seriousness of the drought, would receive more remittances (i.e., to gain access to 
supplies of water). Although their results support the insurance motivation for remitting, they 
noted that, given the lack of enforceability of the insurance arrangement, the migrants’ behavior 
may still imply that they acted in an altruistic manner.
1 
Agarwal and Horowitz [2002], in a study of Guyana, used the impact of the number of 
migrants in each household on remittances as an indicator of altruism versus insurance. They 
argued that if the number of migrants from a single family increases and remittances sent by each 
migrant do not decrease, then individual migrants must be insuring themselves with the 
household. In other words, each migrant needs to “pay in” regardless of the total number of 
migrants. However, if the number of migrants increases and the number of remittances sent by 
each migrant decreases, then remittances are likely made for altruistic reasons; that is, as more 
migrants begin to remit, the household’s demand for support from individual migrants decreases. 
Agarwal and Horowitz’s results suggest that altruism is the main motivation for remittance 
transfers. 
Cox, Eser, and Jimenez [1998] used data from the Peruvian Living Standards Survey to 
test the altruistic motivation of transfers among households against an exchange motivation (i.e., 
households transfer money because they expect reciprocation). Unlike the altruistic motivation, 
which implies a negative relation between transfers and the recipient’s pre-transfer income, 
under the exchange motivation, there may be a positive relation between the transfer amount and 
the recipient pre-transfer income. Using variables such as social security payments, Cox et al. 
found evidence favoring the exchange motivation to remit. 
With this article, we add to this growing body of literature by using the 2003 Quality of 
Life Survey of Colombia to examine the main motivations behind the decision to remit and the 
                                                 
1 Lucas and Stark [1985] also provided insights about the loan repayment motivation for remitting.   4
amount remitted, placing special attention on the impact of crime on transfers. We posit that in 
areas where violent crimes are commonplace, variables related to criminality and violence can be 
used to study the motivations to remit. Crime can have a profound impact on household income 
and assets, thereby encouraging altruistic transfers; however, crime can also discourage the flow 
of self-interested transfers by negatively affecting returns. By examining the response of 
transfers after a household member has been a victim of a crime, we provide insights on why 
migrants transfer money and, thereby, increase our understanding of the motives that drive 
remittances and migration. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first study to focus on 
crime as a means to study the motivation for transfers. 
Colombia is a country with a legacy of violence that continues today. Violence has forced 
approximately 4% of the population to leave their homes and become refugees [Arboleda and 
Correa 2002]. In 2004 alone, over 250,000 Colombians were forced to become refugees 
[UNICEF 2006]. Most of the refugees come from rural areas, but the violence, in conjunction 
with an economic downturn at the end of the 1990s, also induced a large exodus of highly 
educated citizens.
2 In total, between 2000 and 2005, about 1 million Colombians migrated to the 
United States, Spain, and Costa Rica [Inter-American Development Bank 2006].  
A consequence of this surge in internal and overseas migration has been a significant 
increase in the flow of domestic and international remittance transfers into the country as 
Colombian migrants send money to family and friends left behind in their home communities. In 
2002, remittances to Colombia amounted to 2,092 million US dollars (US$) but rose more than 
                                                 
2 For example, Saravia and Miranda [2004] reported that Colombians who are working in research and development 
abroad are the equivalent of one-half the scientists involved in research and development in Colombia. A recent 
study done by Adams [2003] for the World Bank shows that of South American countries, Colombia has the highest 
number of immigrants (age 25 and older) to the United States with a tertiary education (12 years or more).    5
twofold to US$4,200 million by 2006.
3 A recent survey on licensed money transmitters 
conducted by the New York State Banking Department found that in one New York City 
neighborhood alone (Jackson Heights in Queens), Colombians sent back home over US$20 
million between June 2004 and June 2005 [Nikolov 2006]. 
International remittances in Colombia are also substantial when compared with other 
Latin American countries. In 2006, Colombia ranked third among Latin American countries in 
total remittances received, just behind Brazil and Mexico. Moreover, remittances to Colombia 
accounted for 3.3% of the country’s gross domestic product—a higher share than both Brazil 
(0.3%) and Mexico (2.9%) [International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2007]. In addition, 
the declining in the cost of transferring money and the increasing stock of Colombians abroad 
promises a continuing flow of remittances to Colombia in the years ahead.
4 
In addition to studying the impact of crime on money transfers, this article also 
contributes to the overall discussion of remittances in Colombia, a topic that remains relatively 
unexplored in the literature. The Colombian experience represents a unique and interesting case 
for studying the relation between remittances and crime for several reasons: (a) Colombia has a 
large number of internal and overseas migrants, (b) it receives a substantial flow of remittances 
(ranking third in Latin America), (c) it is one of the most violent countries in Latin America, and 
(d) it has a large drug trafficking industry. Because one of the main priorities of the U.S. 
government in regulating remittances is to disrupt illegitimate transfers and facilitate legitimate 
transfers, information on the determinants of remittance transfers can assist government 
                                                 
3 The estimates of remittances from the Inter-American Development Bank are based mainly on recorded remittance 
flows. There is the argument that an important portion of remittance flows are sent through unofficial channels and, 
thus, official figures underestimate the total flow of remittances. However, Colombia’s Central Bank has been 
recognized as one of the best agencies in accounting and reporting remittances [Inter-American Development Bank 
2006]. 
4 In fact, the Inter-American Development Bank has recognized that “the money transfer market in Colombia is 
becoming more competitive, with new small businesses entering the sector” [Inter-American Development Bank 
2006, p. 23].   6
authorities to ensure that remittance channels are not abused by criminals and yet remain open 




A Simple Model 
In this section, we present a conceptual framework for analyzing migrants’ remittances. The 
most commonly accepted motivation for remittance transfers is altruism; that is, migrants care 
about the household’s well-being and remit to improve the household’s living conditions. If 
altruism is a motivation to remit, variables such as household consumption should enter the 
migrant’s utility function. A decline in variables affecting household consumption, such as 
household income, should encourage more transfers. Being the victim of a crime may have an 
adverse impact on household income or create additional financial needs on the part of the 
household, thus encouraging increased altruistic transfers. 
Although intuitively appealing, altruism alone has failed to explain the totality of 
remittance transfers. Another alternative explanation for remitting behavior is “self-interest” 
motives. One of the self-interest motives to remit that is frequently mentioned in the literature is 
inheritance. In this case, migrants remit because they hope to benefit from the household’s 
gratitude, which may materialize as a portion of the household’s inheritance [de la Briere, 
Sadouleth, de Janvry, and Lambert 2002].
6 As such, if self-interest is the main motivation for 
remitting, then changes in the expected return of remittances should impact the level of transfers. 
                                                 
5 For instance, John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of Treasury of International Affairs under President George W. 
Bush administration, recently expressed in this regard that “to make sure remittance channels are not abused by 
criminals or terrorists, we [the U.S. Government] are working with the IMF, World Bank and FATF to enhance 
country compliance with anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing standards. It is in all of our interests 
to make formal channels more efficient and attractive for users so that legitimate flows need not flow outside of 
these formal institutions” [Taylor 2004]. 
6 See Alonso-Carrera, Caballe, and Raurich [2007], Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers [1985] and Constantinides et 
al. [2007] for further discussion on the economics of bequests.   7
Because crimes can potentially affect household assets, criminality may have important effects 
on the return to remittances. 
In the model below, migrants remit for household consumption and self-interest purposes 
in the first or current period, where a denotes remittances intended to be consumed by the 
household and s denotes remittances sent for self-interest motives. The migrant uses his or her 
income in the current period (y) to consume in the host community and to send remittances. 
Thus, the budget constraint is given by 
 y  = c +a +s. (1) 
The migrant’s utility is assumed to be additively separable and depends on his or her 
consumption during the current and future periods (c and 
F c , respectively) and the consumption 
of the household in the home community (
* c ). Household consumption depends positively on 
household income  ) (
* y  and a, that is,  ) , (
* * y a c . The migrant’s consumption in the future 
depends on the remittances he or she sends for self-interest motives (s). Hence, future 
consumption is given by  , where  .
7 As previously mentioned, examples of this 
return can be the return to an investment in the home community or a portion of the household’s 
inheritance. 
The migrant’s problem is to choose c, a, and s to maximize his or her utility, subject to 
the constraint implied by equation (1). Letting β represent the discount factor, our maximization 
problem can be written as: 
  } , , { a r c
Max )) ( ( ) ( )) , ( (
* * s c V c U y a c U
F M H γβ α δ + + ,      , (2) 
subject to y = c + a + s. 
                                                 
7   is the first derivative with respect to the ith argument in  .   refers to the second derivative—the derivative 
of  with respect to the ith argument in  . We assume that first derivatives are nonnegative and second 
derivatives are nonpositive.   8
The importance of household consumption in the migrant’s utility function is represented 
by δ , whereas α  and γ  represent the weights on the migrant’s current and future consumption, 
respectively.
8 The migrant’s first-order conditions imply: 
 
*
1 1 1 c U U
H m δ α = , (3) 
 
F m c V U 1 1 1 γβ α = .  (4) 
We obtain several results from our model (see Appendix A for the explicit partial 
derivatives). Remittances intended for family consumption decrease after increases in household 
income, 
* / y a ∂ ∂ ≤ 0. In this case, given that the household need of support declines, the migrant 
can transfer money away from household consumption toward current and future consumption. 
On the other hand, an increase in household income has a positive effect on self-interest 
transfers, 0 /
* ≥ ∂ ∂ y s . Also, increases in the migrant’s income raise remittances,  0 / ≥ ∂ ∂ y a  and 
0 / ≥ ∂ ∂ y s . If household consumption and future consumption are normal goods, this result is as 
we expect.  
 
Some testable Implications 
Table 1 provides a summary of the main predictions of our model. In terms of the empirical 
analysis, as the previous discussion suggests, the impact of crimes on transfers can shed light on 
the relative importance of altruism and self-interest motivations to remit. The model posits that 
altruistic transfers should increase after a decrease in household income. Because crime has the 
potential to decrease household income, we expect that migrants with altruistic motivations for 
transferring money will increase remittances after the household has been negatively affected by 
                                                 
8 is the utility obtained from household consumption,  is the utility obtained from current consumption in the 
host community, and V is the utility obtained from future consumption.    9
crime. Conversely, we expect migrants with self-interest motives for remitting to decrease 
transfers after criminal events because crimes have the potential to decrease the return on 
remittances. For instance, if crimes have a negative impact on household assets, then migrants 
interested in inheriting from the households may decrease transfers.  
 
<<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
In our model, we limit the reasons to remit to two: altruism and self-interest.
9 Although 
these motives are two of the most important reasons to remit, other reasons to remit may exist. 
Nonetheless, we prefer to limit our study to altruism and self-interest and leave other motives for 
future research. 
 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND DATA 
Historical Context  
Colombia has a long history of violence. The assassination of popular leader Jorge Eliécer 
Gaitán in 1948 started a civil conflict, known as La Violencia (The Violence), in which more 
than 200,000 people were killed. After La Violencia, annual homicide rates stabilized at 20 
homicides per 100,000 residents until the 1970s when rates increased dramatically, reaching 80 
homicides per 100,000 residents by 1991. The homicide rate in Colombia remains one of the 
highest in Latin America—three times that of Mexico and Brazil [Levitt and Rubio 2000].  
The recent history of violence in Colombia is strongly related to the drug traffic and to 
the civil conflict among guerillas, paramilitaries, and the Colombian army. The growth of an 
                                                 
9 Examples of papers including just a few motives for remitting in their models include Agarwal and Horowitz 
[2002], Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo [2006b], Cox et al. [1998] and de la Briere et al. [2002], among others. 
   10
impoverished urban population has also resulted in widespread violence in Colombia’s cities. In 
fact, Colombia’s second largest city, Medellin, is considered one the most dangerous cities in the 
Americas, earning the infamous title of “City of Eternal Violence.”
10 Although violence in 
Medellin as well as other cities has decreased somewhat in recent years, criminality rates remain 
high compared with other Latin American cities.  
Moreover, the ongoing conflict among guerillas, paramilitaries, and the army in rural 
areas provides a continuous flow of people displaced by violence into Colombia’s already 
crowded cities. Given the lack of employment opportunities and the need for money to survive, 
these newly displaced persons may be motivated to become involved in criminal activity as a 
means to provide for their families. 
 
A Preliminary Look at the Data 
To study the determinants of remittance transfers and the impact of crime on the decision to 
remit and the amount remitted, we use data from the 2003 Quality of Life Survey of Colombia, 
which is a nationally representative survey that includes detailed information about 22,948 
household heads residing throughout Colombia. The survey was conducted from June 2003 to 
July 2003 in the capital city of Bogotá and from March 2003 to May 2003 in nine other regions 
(Atlántica, Antioquia, Central, Oriental, Orinoquia-Amazonia, Pacífica, San Andrés and 
Providencia, and Valle).
11 
                                                 
10 “City of Eternal Violence” is a reference to Medellin’s traditional title as the “City of the Eternal Spring.” See 
Grisword [2005] for the complete story. 
11 Atlántica includes Guajira, Cesar, Magdalena, Atlántico, Bolivar, Sucre, and Córdoba. Pacífica includes Chocó, 
Cauca, and Nariño. Central includes Caldas, Quindío, Risaralda, Tolima, Huila, and Caquetá. Oriental includes 
Norte de Santander, Santander, Boyacá, Cundinamarca, and Meta. Orinoquia-Amazonia includes Arauca, Casanare, 
Vichada, Guainía, Guaviare, Vaupéz, Amazonas, and Putumayo.    11
Table 2 reports the data on transfers for the households in our sample.
12 The first column 
reports the total transfer amount received by the household from other households during the 
previous 12 months. This variable, originally given in Colombian pesos, is converted to U.S. 
dollars to allow for better comparison with other studies. The households received two types of 
transfers from other households, domestic transfers and international transfers, which are not 
mutually exclusive (i.e., a household could report receiving both types of transfers). The average 
domestic (international) transfer received by the households was about US$487 (US$827). As 
shown in the second column about 19% (3.3%) of the households reported receiving domestic 
(international) transfers during the previous 12 months. Hence, although more households 




<<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, which provide preliminary evidence regarding the relation 
between crime and remittances, show that when we limit our sample to those households that 
were victims of crimes, a slightly higher percentage of the households reported receiving 
transfers in comparison with the total sample. We also see that remittance-recipient households 
that were victims of crimes received more funds than their nonvictim counterparts. Hence, our 
preliminary findings suggest that being the victim of a crime can potentially lead to more 
transfers. However, to test this hypothesis properly, we must first control for other household 
characteristics to determine whether crime’s positive relation to transfers continues to persist. 
                                                 
12 The question we use to obtain transfers reads: “Did you received any money from someone outside the household 
(parents, sons/daughters, other family members, friends)? Did this money come from outside or inside the country?” 
13 The amount reflects the total transfer received by all household members.   12
Table 3 provides additional descriptive statistics of the population in the survey. Not 
surprisingly, given that our sample is limited to household heads, only 32% of the sample are 
women.
14 About 64% of the household heads are married, and the average age is 47 years. 
Households are comprised of an average of four people. We use the average education of the 
adult household members as a measure of household education. From the original scale of 1 to 9, 
the average measure of household education is 3.7 (3 = primary school; 4 =  is secondary 
school).
15 Also, approximately 8% of the households reported that during the previous year at 
least one member of the household suffered from a serious illness, which should encourage 
altruistic transfers. 
 
<<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
We also include variables that control for home ownership, employment, and income. 
Owner is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a household member owns the house, and zero 
otherwise. Being a homeowner should have a positive impact on self-interest transfers as a home 
is an inheritable asset. Almost 53% of the households heads are homeowners. The variable 
employed, equals 1 if the household head is currently employed, and zero otherwise. The 
variable, wage, reports the total monthly earnings of all the household members (including in-
kind payments). Being employed and having higher earnings are expected to have a negative 
impact on altruistic transfers. The average total monthly earnings of the household members is 
US$180. Hence, on average, the households in our sample annual earnings are approximately 
US$2,160. This finding accentuates the importance of transfers for receiving families: The 
                                                 
14 The household head was identified by the household members at the time of the survey. 
15 The education variable include in the estimation is not a categorical variable. This variable was originally coded 
as a categorical variable, but in the estimation we include the average education of the adult household members.   13
average domestic (international) transfer of US$487 (US$827) is equivalent to 22% (38%) of the 
total average earnings from work of the sample households. 
Table 4 reports transfers conditional on household earnings. The first column reports the 
average transfer received by households with total household earnings below the mean of 
household earnings. The second column reports the total amount of remittances received by 
households with total household earnings above the mean of household earnings. It seems that 
households with above-average earnings received a slightly higher amount of money. For this 
group, domestic (international) transfers are approximately US$543 (US$878) US dollars, 
whereas for those households with earnings below average, transfers are approximately US$481 
(US$822).  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
Given the profound economic crisis that Colombia experienced during the late 1990s, we 
are able to create a long-term shock to household income.
16 The variable, income shock, 
represents a long-term shock to household income that should be closely related with altruistic 
transfers. Furthermore, given its potential detrimental impact on household assets, we also expect  
long-term income shock to have a negative impact on self-interest transfers. 
Finally, the variable, victim, is a dummy indicating whether a household member was the 
victim of at least one of the following crimes during previous 12 months: robbery, assault, 
extortion, kidnapping, forced eviction, or homicide. In total, about 14% of the households 
reported being victim of at least one of these events.  
 
                                                 
16 Please refer to Appendix B for a list of the events that constitute a serious economic problem.   14
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
To understand better what drives remitting behavior and to explain the potential impact of crimes 
on remittance transfers, we estimate individual remitting equations for both international and 
domestic transfers. In the following analysis, we first estimate the likelihood that households 
within our sample will receive transfers using a series of probit models. These models provide us 
with information on both the households that did and did not received transfers. Next, we explore 
what accounts for differences in the sums received using a Tobit model. 
 
Who Receives Remittances? 
We include as predictors a series of socio-demographic and economic variables of the household 
including age, sex, employment status and marital status of the household head, household 
monthly earnings, average education level of the adult household members, homeownership 
status, and size of the household. We also include regional dummy variables to control for 
possible regional effects. 
There is, however, a potential econometric issue with our estimation. There may be 
reverse causality with transfers influencing the probability of being the victim of a crime. That is, 
receiving money from abroad  can make the household more susceptible to some types of crimes, 
such as extortions, robberies, and kidnappings. Moreover, unobserved characteristics of 
households may affect both the probability of being victim of a crime and the probability of 
receiving transfers. To account for this potential endogenity problem, we estimate an 
instrumental variable probit (IV-Probit) of whether the household receives transfers, following a 
method similar to the one suggested by Newey [1987].
17 
                                                 
17 We use Newey (1987) minimum x
2 estimator. In the tables, we report results from the second step. Results from 
the first step are available from the authors on request.    15
Previous studies related to migration have used a series of diverse instruments. For 
example, Hanson and Woodruff [2003], in a study of migration and schooling in Mexico, 
instrumented household members migration using the interaction between historical state 
migration patterns and household characteristics. Borraz [2005], in another study for Mexico, 
used the interaction of the geographic distance of the household to the United States with mother 
and household characteristics as an instrument for remittances. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
[2006a] used the interaction between several household characteristics and the per capita count 
of Western Unions in the state as an instrument for remittances, and Choi and Yang [2007] used 
rainfall shocks as an instrument for household income changes to study the insurance motive for 
remitting.  
In our case, we instrument crimes with information on the perceived safety of each region 
in Colombia, which is based on the regional average response of households to the question, “Do 
you feel safe in your neighborhood?” The perceived safety of each region in Colombia should be 
strongly related to the probability of being a victim of a crime but unlikely to be caused by the 
amount of remittances that the household receives. For all regions, about 27% of the households 
responded that they did not feel safe. We used the interaction of the instrumental variable with 
household characteristics to obtain variation across households because the instrument is 
constant among households in the same region.
18 
Using the results of the probit estimation, as reported in Table 5, we can examine the 
impact of the control variables in Table 3 on the likelihood of receiving transfers. The results 
show that households with older household heads have a higher likelihood of receiving transfers. 
However, although this variable is statistically significant, the impact is quite small. Also, the 
                                                 
18 We inspect this variable to corroborate its correlation with crimes by testing its significance in explaining crimes. 
We also test the exogeneity of the instrument following a methodology similar to the one suggested by Wooldridge 
[2006, p. 532].   16
likelihood of receiving both domestic and international transfers increases if the household head 
is a woman—perhaps because men are more likely to migrate to find a better job to provide extra 
money to the household or because family members and friends offer more assistance because 
there is no male provider. 
 
<<INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
For both domestic and international transfers, households are less likely to receive 
transfers if the household head is currently employed, in which case the probability of receiving 
transfers decreases by 10 percentage points (7 percentage points) for domestic transfers 
(international transfers). Higher household earnings also decreases the probability of receiving 
transfers. Although the marginal impact of household earnings seems to be small, in general, 
households with better working conditions have a smaller probability of receiving transfers. As 
one might expect, these households would require less financial support, thus discouraging 
altruistic transfers. Similarly, being a homeowner decreases the probability of receiving transfers 
by about 2 percentage points for both domestic and international transfers. 
Turning now to the impact of crime on remittances, the first (third) column of Table 5 
shows that the likelihood of receiving domestic (international) transfers decreases by about 7 
percentage points (8 percentage points) if a household member has been the victim of a crime. 
Although some of the results for other variables point strongly toward altruism as the prime 
motivation for remitting, the result for crimes suggests that a portion of remittances is sent for 
self-interest purposes. 
   17
How Much Do Households Receive? 
Next, we explore the determinants of the sum of money that households received. We estimate 
the following benchmark model to examine the determinants of transfers in Colombia: 
  , (1) 
for i = 1,…,n individuals. The vector Y measures transfers reported by households, X reports on 
crimes, and Z is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables. However, we cannot estimate the 
determinants of remittance transfers using ordinary least squares because our remittance transfer 
variable is censored at zero. If, for example, a household is sending monetary assistance to 
family members abroad, transfers would be negative. Yet, in our data, transfers are set equal to 
zero. Due to the lack of information on outward remittances, it is not clear what percentage of 
households sends money abroad. Moreover, we have a corner solution model because an 
important fraction of the households did not receive transfers, and, for the others, transfers are 
strictly positive number.
19 
Our estimation has yet another potential econometric issue: Similar to the probit 
estimation, there may be reverse causality with remittances influencing crimes. To account for 
both econometric issues, we conduct an instrumental variable Tobit (IV-Tobit) estimation in 
which the dependent variable is the amount of remittances received by the household. We follow 
a similar procedure to the one for the IV-Probit. Table 6 reports the results of the IV-Tobit 
estimation. The first (third) column reports the results using domestic (international) transfers as 
the dependent variable. Before examining the impact of crime on remittances, we first review the 
impact of the other variables on remittances. 
 
<<INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE>> 
                                                 
19 See Wooldridge [2002, pp. 517–519] for more details on corner solution models.   18
 
In the previous theoretical discussion, we noted that increases in household income 
should decrease the level of remittances for altruistic purposes, which is confirmed by the results 
in Table 6. Our results also provide evidence that, in accordance with the probit estimation, 
households that are homeowners and households with employed household heads receive fewer 
dollars in transfers. In addition, households with a household member who has been seriously ill 
during the last year receive higher annual remittance amounts.  
However, in contrast with the probit results, age does not have a significant impact on 
domestic transfers in the IV-Tobit estimation (Table 6). Moreover, the Tobit model results show 
a difference between domestic and international transfers based on marriage status. Namely, 
households with a married household head receive less domestic transfers, but the same variable 
has no significant impact on international transfers. 
Our main empirical question is whether transfers increase or decrease after the household 
is the victim of a crime. The results in Tables 6 suggest that both transfers decrease if a 
household member was a victim of a crime. Specifically, being the victim of a crime decreases 
domestic (international) transfers by approximately US$152 (US$414) per year at the mean. 
Hence, the results for the Tobit estimation are in line with the results of the probit estimation; 
that is, crime affects both the probability of receiving transfers and the amount received. 
This finding highlights the importance of self-interest motivations for transfers of money 
to households in Colombia. Crime may have a negative impact on household wealth, and, 
therefore, migrants interested in inheriting from the household assets may decrease remittance 
transfers following acts of crime against the household. Alternatively, migrants who are 
investing in their home communities through the household may decrease transfers as crimes   19
against the household may decrease the expected return to these investments. Despite the validity 
of these findings, results for other variables such as employment conditions, homeownership, 




To check for robustness, we substitute the crime variable with a variable that adds 1 for 
each type of crime (robberies, assaults, extortion, kidnapping, forced eviction, and homicide) that 
a household member suffered. Hence, a household that was the victim of all types of crimes has 
a value of 6, and a household that was not a victim of crimes has a value of zero. We then follow 
a similar instrumental variable procedure for the estimation. The results for the instrumental 
variable Tobit using this alternative variable to represent crime are reported in Table 7. Results 
show that domestic (international) transfers decrease by US$186 (US$363) at the mean for each 
additional type of crime. Results for the control variables are also consistent across 
specifications. 
 
<<INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This article examines the determinants of remittance transfers using the 2003 Quality of Life 
Survey of Colombia. We place special emphasis on the impact of crimes on transfers to obtain 
insights into migrants’ motivations to remit.   20
Results show that both domestic and international transfers decrease with better 
household working conditions and if a household member owns the home. Both types of 
transfers are positively related to household size and a household member suffering from a 
serious illness during the previous year. These results accentuate the role of altruism as a 
motivating factor for transfers in Colombia. In sum, as previously posited, our findings suggest 
that better household economic conditions have a negative impact on altruistic transfers, whereas 
a larger financial need on the part of the household encourages altruistic transfers. 
Turning to our findings on how crime impacts money transfers, a preliminary look at the 
data suggests a positive relation between crimes and transfers. However, once we account for 
potential endogeneity issues and include other control variables, the results, in fact, indicate that 
both domestic and international transfers are negatively impacted by crimes. These findings 
suggest that transfers in Colombia not only have an altruistic basis but also have a self-interest 
component. Crime may have a negative impact on household wealth, and migrants interested in 
inheriting from the household may subsequently decrease transfers. Alternatively, migrants who 
are investing in their home countries through the household may decrease transfers following 
crimes against the household as these criminal acts may decrease the expected return to 
investments. Although the results for crimes support self-interest as a motivation for remitting, 
given the results for other variables we do not discard altruism as an important motivation to 
remit. 
The security situation in Colombia has improved somewhat over the last three years. As a 
consequence, the economy has performed better than expected. Gross domestic product growth 
during 2006 was almost 7 %, while inflation was only 4.3% (very low by previous years 
standards). Our results suggest that these improvements in security may encourage remittance   21
transfers for investment and other self-interest purposes. At the same time, the improvement in 
economic conditions should discourage altruistic transfers. The net impact of these changes on 
total remittance flows is difficult to predict; however, based on the findings of this study, if this 
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The second order condition (SOC) for our problem is: 
 
  . 








Independent variable   
Age  Age of the household head in years. 
Sex  Sex of the household head. Female = 1, zero otherwise. 
Married  Civil status of the household head. Married = 1, zero otherwise. 
Household education  Average education level of the household members. The original variable was coded 
on a 1 to 9 scale for each individual. 
Employed  1 if household head is currently employed, zero otherwise. 
Household wage  Monthly earnings of all the household members (including in-kind payments) in U.S. 
dollars. 
Income shock 
This variable adds 1 for each of the following events: someone in the household lost 
his/her job, the household had to close a family business, the household was unable to 
pay for the kids’ school for at least 4 consecutive months, the household was unable to 
pay for college for one of the household members, the household was unable to pay the 
mortgage for at least 4 consecutive months, the household was unable to pay for public 
utilities for at least 4 consecutive months, the household was unable to pay the 
homeowner's association fee for at least 4 consecutive months, the household was 
unable to pay taxes or the household was forced to sell the house. Thus, the variable 
goes from 0 (no event) to 9 (all events). 
Home owner  1 if a household member owns the house, zero otherwise. 
People  Number of people in the household. 
Sick  1 if a household member suffered from a serious illness during the previous 12 months, 
zero otherwise. 
Victim 
1 if during the last 12 months a household member was a victim of at least one of the 
following crimes: robberies, assaults, extortion, kidnapping, forced eviction and 
homicide, zero otherwise. 
Crimes 
This variable adds 1 for each of the following events: robberies, assaults, extortion, 
kidnapping, forced eviction and homicide. Thus, the variable goes from 0 (no event) to 
6 (all events). 
Security  Regional average response to “Do you feel safe in your neighborhood?”, No = 1, zero
otherwise. 
Dependent variables   
International remit  Dummy equal to one if the household received international transfers. 
Domestic remit  Dummy equal to one if the household received domestic transfers. 
International transfers  Total transfer received by the household from abroad (in U.S. dollars), during the 
previous 12 months. 
Domestic transfers  Total transfer received by the household from others in Colombia (in U.S. dollars), 
during the previous 12 months. 
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Table 1 – Predictions of the model 
  Impact on Transfers 
 Altruistic  Self-Interest 
Variable (1)  (2) 
Migrant’s income  +  + 
Household income  –  + 
   28
 
Table 2 – Domestic and international transfers 
  All Households    Crime Victims 
  Average Amount 
(US$) Households  (%)   
Average Amount 
(US$) Households  (%) 
Type of Transfer  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Domestic 487  19.17  665  25.82 
International 827  3.34  931  5.46 
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Table 3 – Other descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean 
  (1) 
Age  46.93 
Sex (%)  31.83  
Married (%)  63.68  
Household education  3.71 
Employed (%)  72.37 
Household earnings  179.36 
Income shock  .80 
Home owner (%)  52.5 
People 3.71 
Sick (%)  8.28 
Victim (%)  13.8  
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Table 4 – Remittances (in US dollars) and household earnings. 
 Below  Average  Earnings  Above Average Earnings 
Type of Transfer  (1)  (2) 
Domestic 481.22  542.51 
International 821.52  878.37 
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Table 5 – IV-Probit remitting equation. 
 Domestic  Transfers    International Transfers 
 Estimate  t-stat   Estimate  t-stat 
Variable (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Age 0.00  1.91
* 0.00  2.31
** 
Sex 0.09  6.17
*** 0.07  2.63
*** 
Married –0.06  –6.32
*** –0.02  –1.61 
Household Education  0.00  3.22
*** 0.01  7.66
*** 
Employed –0.10  –8.28
*** –0.07  –3.76
*** 
Household Earnings  –0.00  –4.38
*** –0.00  –2.87
*** 
Income Shock  0.02  6.48
*** 0.05  9.3
*** 
Home owner  –0.02  –2.62
*** –0.02  –1.73
* 
People 0.01  3.94
*** 0.01  3.82
*** 
Sick 0.04  5.16
*** 0.08  4.34
*** 
Victim –.07  –1.66
* –.08  –2.91
*** 
N  22,948   22,948   
LR χ
2 2,009.45
***   1,089.24
***  
Log Likelihood  –18,089.03    –10,891.367   
Notes: Marginal effects at the average are reported with t-statistics. The estimations also include regional dummy 
variables.***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.    32
 
Table 6 – IV-Tobit remitting equation. 
 Domestic  Transfers    International Transfers 
 Estimate  t-stat   Estimate  t-stat 
Variable (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Age –0.46  –0.49  9.54  3.55
*** 
Sex 291.56  10.47
*** 332.71  3.96
*** 
Married –139.73  –4.61
*** –119.20  –1.33 
Household education  110.28  6.63
*** 302.52  6.63
*** 
Employed –453.75  –18.72
*** –516.47  –7.05
*** 
Household Earnings  –.27  –6.78
*** –.55  –4.28
*** 
Income Shock  86.38  3.61
*** 226.91  3.53
*** 
Home owner  –51.38  –2.29
** –150.79  –2.21
** 
People 26.17  3.23
*** 62.93  2.71
*** 
Sick 170.16  3.18
*** 429.13  2.94
*** 
Victim –152.10  –1.74
* –413.88  –1.79
* 
N  22,948   2,2948  





Log  Likelihood -51,386.28  -17,013.54  
Notes: Marginal effects at the average are reported with t-statistics. The estimations also include regional dummy 
variables.***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.  
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Table 7 – IV-Tobit remitting equation using alternative variable for crimes 
 Domestic  Transfers    International Transfers 
 Estimate  t-stat   Estimate  t-stat 
Variable  (1) (2)    (3) (4) 
Crime –186.36  –2.02
**  –363.40  –1.67
* 
Notes: Marginal effects at the average are reported with t-statistics. The estimations also include regional dummy 
variables.***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively.  
 